Key Details
The OECD policy brief Economic Security in Global Production: Understanding Dependencies and Vulnerabilities Across Global Value Chains uses Inter-Country Input-Output tables to trace where value is created as goods move through production networks.
India–China asymmetry: The gap between India’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing value-added and China’s dependence on Indian value-added widened from 4.6 percentage points in 2000 to 24.4 points in 2024.
Production concentration: China was the largest producer of value-added in 14 of 18 manufacturing industries examined in 2024, compared with none in 2000.
Supplier position: China was the leading foreign source of value-added in around 40% of the country-industry relationships examined in 2024, up from about 4% in 2000.
Wider imbalance: All 79 partner economies assessed depended more on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on theirs in 2024.
India’s Dependence Is More Unequal Than Two Decades Ago
The India figure measures a difference in reliance, not the share of India’s imports bought from China. In 2024, Chinese value-added contributed substantially more to India’s manufacturing final demand than Indian value-added contributed to China’s. That gap had widened by 19.8 percentage points since 2000.
This India finding sits within a broader change in production. China now accounts for 37–48% of world value-addedin each of five manufacturing industries highlighted by the OECD, including electrical equipment, metals, textiles and apparel. Its role has also expanded as a supplier to other countries’ production and consumption.
Direct Imports Do Not Show the Whole Supply Chain
A component made in China may pass through another country, become part of a finished product and reach India without appearing as a direct Chinese import of that component. The OECD’s value-added approach follows the original source of production through these stages.
Its Latin American steel example demonstrates the mechanism: Chinese steel reaches the region both directly and embedded in downstream products shipped through third economies. That example is not an estimate of India’s steel exposure, but it explains why India-specific assessments need to look beyond bilateral trade totals.
Dependence Is a Signal to Investigate, Not Proof of Vulnerability
The OECD cautions that concentrated supply does not by itself establish an economic-security risk. The consequence of a disruption depends on which input is involved, whether alternative suppliers exist and how difficult substitution would be. Its high-level data map changing relationships; more detailed sector-, firm- and product-level evidence is needed to identify specific chokepoints.
Policy Relevance
The finding makes targeted supply-chain assessment more useful for India than treating every Chinese input as equally risky. Trade and industrial policy can first identify where direct and indirect reliance intersects with hard-to-replace components or strategically important production. That evidence can distinguish cases for supplier diversification or domestic capability-building from relationships where open trade remains the better option.
Follow the Full Policy Brief Here: OECD, Economic Security in Global Production