Key Details
PNGRB’s Report of the High-Level Expert Committee examines recent damage to natural-gas and petroleum-product pipelines and proposes two connected responses: protect vulnerable stretches more effectively and keep supplies moving when a pipeline fails.
Area | Committee Recommendation |
|---|---|
River crossings | Use underground, trenchless methods as the norm; allow open-cut crossings only with documented technical reasons and approval. |
Design margins | Account for river movement and flood risks; extend drilled crossings beyond the estimated maximum river width and increase minimum pipe cover below the calculated erosion depth to 2.5 metres. |
Hazard assessment | Make geo-hazard studies part of the design requirements for major natural-gas and petroleum-product pipelines. |
Monitoring | Map and regularly inspect vulnerable crossings, with closer surveillance during the monsoon and after abnormal flows. |
City-gas continuity | Develop looped networks, multiple feeds and emergency supply arrangements, supported by area-specific supply-security plans. |
River Movement Can Undermine a Crossing Built to Earlier Conditions
The committee was formed after pipeline exposure and ruptures associated with natural calamities. Its central finding is that a pipe can remain intact while the ground protecting it changes: floods scour riverbeds, erode banks and leave buried sections exposed or unsupported.
Some failures occurred beyond the ends of underground drilled crossings. That matters because a crossing designed around an earlier estimate of a river’s width may not protect the pipeline if the channel later shifts. The committee proposes longer crossings, more conservative assessments of flooding and erosion, and stronger protection where pipelines run close to rivers. It also recommends avoiding open-cut river crossings except where a technical case is formally approved.
Local Damage Has Disrupted Gas Supply Far Beyond the Failure Site
The consequences extend beyond repair of the damaged pipe. An August 2025 rupture on the Karanpur–Moradabad–Kashipur–Rudrapur gas pipeline disrupted supply to 97 industries, more than 56 commercial customers and 19 compressed natural gas (CNG) stations. Another rupture on the Dadri–Bawana–Nangal pipeline affected 464 industries, more than 176 commercial customers and 21 CNG stations.
Not every threat came from flooding. The committee also examined damage caused by third-party construction work, underscoring the need for coordination between pipeline operators and agencies working near buried lines. These cases show why physical safety and continuity of supply need to be planned together.
City-Gas Networks Need Ways Around a Failed Feeder
A city-gas distribution network may depend heavily on one upstream pipeline. The committee recommends that operators progressively build looped networks and multiple supply connections, so gas can be redirected when one route is unavailable. It also proposes links between neighbouring service areas, backup compressed or liquefied gas supplies where feasible, and plans identifying which consumers would receive priority during an interruption.
The recommendations would add supply-continuity measures to PNGRB’s technical standards and emergency-response planning. They have not yet amended those requirements.
What Is a Trenchless Crossing? A pipeline can be drilled or tunnelled beneath a river instead of being laid through an excavated riverbed. The committee’s concern is not only how deep such a crossing runs, but whether it extends far enough beyond the river’s possible future course.
Policy Relevance
For PNGRB: The proposed amendments would make changing river conditions, erosion and supply continuity more explicit parts of pipeline regulation—not just matters addressed after an incident.
For pipeline operators: Existing vulnerable crossings require monitoring as well as stronger standards for new construction. A technically sound crossing can still become exposed if the surrounding riverbank moves.
For city-gas providers: Backup capacity has to be planned across the network. Multiple feeds, connections and emergency supplies could limit the reach of an outage, though their feasibility will differ by service area.
Follow the Full Report Here: PNGRB’s High-Level Expert Committee Report on Pipeline Supply Security and Resilience