Key Details
The OECD policy brief Planning ahead for the next pandemic: Acting early saves lives and protects economies uses its Strategic Public Health Planning Model to simulate the first nine months of five types of outbreak, when vaccines and treatments may not yet be widely available.
Modelled finding | Result |
|---|---|
Probability of another COVID-19-scale pandemic | Roughly one in two within 25 years, based on cited scientific research |
Time before intensive-care capacity is exhausted | Around one to two months in most unmitigated scenarios |
GDP loss without mitigation | 2.7% for a coronavirus-like outbreak; 16.2% for a measles-like outbreak |
Basic “safer contact” measures | Could prevent at least 40% of deaths |
Layered contact-reduction measures | Could avert the vast majority of deaths, with GDP losses around 2.5% in most scenarios |
Combined clinical and wastewater surveillance | Could avert 41% more deaths in a coronavirus-like scenario than clinical surveillance alone |
Effect on lockdown duration | Up to a 90% reduction where lockdowns remain necessary |
Estimated OECD preparedness cost | USD PPP 7.1 billion annually, or USD PPP 5.9 per person |
India is included within the broader G20 modelling group, but the brief does not publish India-specific health, economic or investment estimates.
Health Systems Can Reach Their Limits Within Weeks
In an outbreak allowed to spread without intervention, the model indicates that intensive-care capacity could be exhausted rapidly — even if countries temporarily expand available beds to 130% of normal capacity.
Once critical care is saturated, the consequences extend beyond infected patients. People requiring intensive care for heart attacks, strokes, cancer and other conditions may also face reduced access. Pandemic preparedness is therefore partly about protecting the continuity of the wider health system.
The economic effects arise simultaneously. Transport and storage output could fall by 13–19%, manufacturing by 6–16%, and administrative, professional and technical services by 4–16%, depending on the pathogen. Essential services remain more resilient, but none is entirely insulated under the most severe scenario.
Earlier, Lighter Measures Can Prevent Harsher Restrictions
The modelling compares increasingly stringent packages of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) — public-health measures used before vaccines or effective treatments become available.
The sequence begins with:
Hand hygiene, masks and ventilation → voluntary isolation → teleworking and mandatory quarantine → domestic travel limits → targeted closures, if necessary
Basic infection controls and voluntary quarantine could prevent at least 40% of deaths in otherwise unmitigated outbreaks. Adding teleworking, mandatory quarantine and limited domestic travel restrictions could avert most deaths while avoiding school closures, international travel restrictions and lockdowns in most scenarios.
By contrast, imposing a lockdown alone after other measures have failed is modelled as both the least effective health strategy and the most economically damaging. Depending on the pathogen, output could fall by 11.7–28.9%.
The finding is not that lockdowns can always be avoided. Low public compliance may still make stricter measures necessary. Public trust, credible communication and practical support for isolation therefore form part of preparedness—not merely the response after an outbreak begins.
Surveillance Changes How Early Governments Can Act
Clinical reporting detects an outbreak after patients seek care. Wastewater surveillance can identify pathogen circulation earlier because infected people may shed biological material before symptoms lead them to a clinic.
In a coronavirus-like outbreak, combining clinical and wastewater data could:
trigger basic precautions sooner;
avert 41% more deaths than clinical surveillance alone; and
shorten a necessary lockdown by as much as 90%, equivalent in some cases to nearly three additional weeks without lockdown.
Early warning only becomes useful if governments have predefined thresholds for action, laboratories able to validate signals and local authorities prepared to implement a proportionate response.
Stockpiles Must Be Maintained, Not Merely Purchased
The OECD estimates that approximately 53% of additional preparedness spending would be required for personal protective equipment and hygiene stockpiles, while 43% would support systems for physical contact-reduction measures. Surveillance improvements would cost less than USD PPP 1 per person annually.
Effective stockpiling requires more than holding supplies in warehouses. It depends on:
demand and surge estimates;
inventory rotation and expiry management;
regional distribution arrangements;
tested procurement and transport systems; and
clear authority over release and replenishment.
These assets can also support responses to antimicrobial resistance, natural disasters and chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear emergencies.
Policy Relevance
India has already invested in disease surveillance, laboratories and emergency-response capacity through the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme, Integrated Health Information Platform and PM-ABHIM. The OECD findings highlight what these systems must achieve in practice:
Detect early: Combine clinical, laboratory, genomic and wastewater surveillance so that emerging outbreaks are identified before hospitals face a surge.
Link warnings to action: Establish clear thresholds for releasing stockpiles, expanding hospital capacity and introducing proportionate public-health measures.
Prepare states and districts: National surveillance is effective only when local authorities have trained response teams, supplies and workable emergency plans.
Cost for Indian conditions: The OECD’s spending estimate cannot be transferred directly to India. Domestic requirements will depend on population scale, state capacity, rural logistics and existing infrastructure.
The central implementation test is whether India can move quickly from detection to verification and local response — before more disruptive restrictions become necessary.
Follow the Full Policy Brief Here: OECD, Planning Ahead for the Next Pandemic: Acting Early Saves Lives and Protects Economies