SDG 4: Quality Education | SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth | SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities
Ministry of Education | NITI Aayog
The ADBI Working Paper titled ‘Parental Migration and Unconditional Cash Transfers for Education: Evidence from the Smart Indonesia Program’ finds that providing unconditional financial aid to poor households can trigger unintended social consequences, specifically regarding parental migration and child education. It examines the Smart Indonesia Program (PIP), a large-scale unconditional cash transfer (UCT) scheme designed to improve school participation among children from poor households. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach and national survey data, the study reveals that, contrary to its primary objective, the program led to a significant decrease in school participation among children of temporary migrant parents in treated regions. This suggests that the mere provision of funds does not guarantee educational enrollment in households facing complex migration dynamics.
Unintended Drivers of Parental Migration
The research highlights a critical “migration-facilitation” effect where cash transfers intended for education are repurposed for economic mobility.
Relaxing Financial Constraints: The PIP funds appear to have relaxed household budget constraints, allowing parents to use the transfers to cover the startup costs of migration rather than school fees.
The Role of Migration Networks: The negative impact on schooling was most pronounced in areas with strong migration networks, where established social links lowered the risk and cost of moving, further enticing parents to leave.
Age and Gender Disparities: The study confirms that female children and older children remain the most vulnerable, exhibiting lower school participation rates compared to their peers, while maternal education remains a strong positive predictor for a child staying in school.
Policy Trade-offs: UCTs vs. CCTs
A key finding of the paper is the potential superiority of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in protecting children left behind.
Enforced Enrollment: Unlike the PIP’s unconditional model, conditional transfers can mandate school attendance and regular health checks as a prerequisite for receiving aid.
Mitigating Migration Risks: By tying funds strictly to the child’s presence in school, policymakers can potentially discourage parents from using education-linked funds for migration, thereby reducing the “emotional and financial barriers” faced by children left behind.
The Need for Targeting: The authors conclude that educational programs must be better targeted to address the specific risks inherent in migrant-sending communities.
Policy Relevance
The insights from Indonesia are directly applicable to India’s internal migration corridors and its evolving social protection landscape under the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) scheme.
Addressing the “Left-Behind” Crisis: India has a massive population of internal migrants from states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Odisha; this research warns that unconditional aid in these regions might inadvertently encourage parents to migrate, leaving children without adequate educational supervision.
Refining DBT Conditionalities: India could benefit from re-evaluating its educational DBT programs to incorporate stricter attendance-linked conditions, ensuring that funds are utilized for human capital development rather than migration expenses.
Leveraging Migration Networks: Understanding that migration networks act as “multipliers” for financial aid allows Indian policymakers to design more nuanced interventions in high-migration districts where the risk of educational neglect is highest.
Closing the Gender Gap: The persistent disparities for female and older children in the study reinforce the need for India to maintain its focus on targeted gender-based incentives, such as the Beti Bachao Beti Padhao linkage.
Follow the full paper here: PARENTAL MIGRATION AND UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE SMART INDONESIA PROGRAM