A background note can be accessed here: India Keeps Pakistan Ties Limited as Counter-Terrorism Condition Remains
India has made the credible end of cross-border terrorism a condition for normalisation, while retaining limited diplomatic and operational engagement. How should India define the threshold for moving from restricted engagement towards broader diplomatic normalisation, particularly when security conditions may improve incrementally rather than through a single decisive break?
Our conditions for normalisation of relations remain the same: dismantling the terror infrastructure, putting an end to the infiltration of terrorists and the fuelling of terrorism within Jammu and Kashmir and across the country. In addition, there should be verifiable proof of intent, such as handing over terrorists on our wanted list. Normalisation seems distant at present.
If Pakistan wants to talk, we should talk on any issue to show that we are willing to engage. But after every discussion, we should reiterate the condition that cross-border terrorism must cease before relations can be normalised. Political dialogue with Pakistan’s civilian authority is unlikely to be meaningful on security issues. It is time to engage Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, given the central role of the military leadership in Pakistan’s decision-making. We have done it in Afghanistan and accepted the reality. The only question is whether the situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan becomes unstable, because until then Pakistan has no interest in coming to the table.
India's response has expanded from diplomatic and economic restrictions to measures affecting visas, border movement, diplomatic representation, the Indus Waters Treaty, and military action. How should India assess the strategic effectiveness and longer-term costs of progressively widening the instruments used to impose pressure on Pakistan?
The stoppage of water flows under the Indus Waters Treaty is already a huge cost imposed, though India can face a similar issue with rivers flowing in from China. I don’t think we have any leverage, nor is there any indication of Pakistan succumbing to pressure. With US President Donald Trump leaning towards Pakistan, including in the context of his cryptocurrency interests, exploring the mineral wealth in Balochistan, and China enlarging its security umbrella, there is no looking back for Pakistan. It is also no longer on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and serves as a vice chair of the United Nations Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee.
The best way to deal with Pakistan is to ignore it, stop cursing it every day, and stop pronouncing its doom every time something untoward happens. Ignore it at the United Nations too, and give cursory replies treating it as a minor irritant. We need to behave like a big nation and wait for the time when talks can be held. We should therefore avoid measures simply for the sake of exerting pressure and retain the flexibility to decide when and how to engage.
Despite the absence of broader political normalisation, India and Pakistan continue DGMO-level communication, missile-test notifications, exchanges concerning nuclear installations, and prisoner information. What institutional architecture should India preserve or strengthen to manage military and humanitarian risks during prolonged diplomatic estrangement, and how can these channels remain operational without creating ambiguity about the conditions for political normalisation?
Crisis communication should continue through the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs), while humanitarian issues such as innocent civilians crossing the border, fishermen at sea, medical emergencies, consular work, and the exchange and return of prisoners should continue to be addressed through other established channels.
These functional channels should be preserved even during prolonged diplomatic estrangement because they help manage military and humanitarian risks. Their continuation should remain separate from political normalisation and should not create ambiguity about the conditions for broader diplomatic engagement.