Key Details
The Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report No. 7 of 2026 evaluates the implementation of Phases 1 and 2 of the Bangalore Metro Rail Project. The audit covers planning, implementation and operations from BMRCL’s inception to March 2021, with contract and financial information updated to March 2023. Its figures therefore describe the project at that cut-off, not the metro’s present operating position.
Audit Finding | What It Indicates |
|---|---|
Phase 1 cost rose from ₹6,258 crore to ₹14,133.17 crore—a 126% increase | Delays, higher land costs, civil works and interest during construction substantially altered project viability |
Phase 1 was completed more than three years late | Land acquisition and contract execution were not aligned with the construction schedule |
Highest average daily ridership was 5.89 lakh against an envisaged 19.49 lakh | Passenger and revenue projections used to justify investment were not achieved |
Farebox revenue during 2016–17 to 2022–23 was ₹1,758.13 crore against ₹7,736.70 crore projected | Actual ticket revenue reached only 22.72% of projections |
Land-management deficiencies increased acquisition costs by ₹6,603.39 crore across the two phases | Initial land estimates, acquisition timelines and valuation controls were inadequate |
Cash losses totalled ₹970.62 crore during 2013–14 to 2021–22 | BMRCL depended on the Karnataka Government to meet debt-servicing obligations |
Parking was unavailable at 18 of 51 operational stations | Station access and last-mile integration remained incomplete |
Building the Metro Was Only Part of the Transport Challenge
Bengaluru Metro’s first phase cost ₹14,133 crore—126% above its initial estimate—and was completed more than three years late. More importantly, ridership fell well short of the levels underpinning its financial and economic case.
The highest average daily ridership recorded by the audit was 5.89 lakh, against 19.49 lakh projected. Between 2016–17 and 2022–23, ticket revenue reached only 22.72% of projections. BMRCL accumulated cash losses of ₹970.62 crore between 2013–14 and 2021–22 and relied on the Karnataka Government for debt servicing.
These findings largely reflect information up to March 2023 and should not be treated as the metro’s current operating position.
The Missing Link Was an Integrated Transport Network
CAG links low ridership to wider planning weaknesses. Phase 2 was designed before Bengaluru had approved comprehensive mobility and transit-oriented development plans, while passenger forecasts were not tested against lower-demand scenarios before choosing a capital-intensive heavy metro.
Access to stations also remained incomplete. Multimodal integration operated at only three hubs, 18 of 51 stations lacked parking, and several locations had inadequate feeder services and pedestrian access.
Meanwhile, BMTC daily ridership fell from 51.30 lakh in 2014–15 to 27.49 lakh in 2022–23. Even after adding metro passengers, combined bus-and-metro use remained below the earlier level of bus ridership.
The issue was therefore not simply low metro ridership, but the absence of the intended city-wide shift from private vehicles towards public transport.
Land Increased Costs Without Generating Expected Revenue
Land-management shortcomings increased acquisition costs by ₹6,603 crore across the two phases, while delays contributed to construction hold-ups and contractor claims.
Yet land intended to generate non-fare revenue remained underused. Only one of eight Phase 1 property parcels had been developed, while 55 hectares underlying Phase 2 property-income projections had not been acquired by March 2023. Commercial space within stations also remained substantially vacant.
Land therefore created a double constraint: acquisition raised project costs, while property and station assets failed to generate the revenue expected from them.
Policy Relevance
Future metro approvals need demand ranges, not a single ridership forecast. Testing lower-demand scenarios would show whether a corridor remains financially and economically defensible if passengers adopt the system more slowly than expected.
Urban transport funding should reward integration. Metro construction, feeder-bus redesign, pedestrian access and common ticketing are interdependent investments; financing them separately can leave expensive rail capacity underused.
Land readiness should precede major civil awards. Completing acquisition, utility shifting and statutory clearances before awarding construction contracts can reduce claims, interest costs and schedule disruption.
Commercial development must move from DPR assumptions to executable plans. Revenue attributed to property development should be counted towards viability only when land, approvals and a monetisation strategy are in place.
Operational performance needs network-wide measurement. Metro ridership alone can give a misleading picture if bus use falls and private-vehicle dependence remains unchanged. Monitoring should track the combined public-transport share, travel time and modal shift.
Follow the Full CAG Report Here: Report No. 7 of 2026: Implementation of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of Bangalore Metro Rail Project by Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited.