From Devices to Doorsteps: What It Takes to Make Offline Aadhaar Work
India’s offline Aadhaar push must pair technology with institutional discipline to avoid new digital divides
A background note can be accessed here: UIDAI Builds Offline-Verification Ecosystem
Dr. Mehak Rai Sethi: Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, Amity University, Punjab
SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
The new offline-verification mechanism allows users to selectively share identity information and enables biometric verification without internet connectivity. How significant is this shift for strengthening user control, reducing misuse, and building trust – and what behavioural or institutional hurdles might still limit its effectiveness?
The new offline-verification system marks a meaningful shift because it allows people to share only the identity details required for a transaction rather than handing over their full Know Your Customer (KYC) record. It also enables biometric checks without an internet connection. Together, these features operationalise the principle of data minimisation, reducing the chances that personal information is copied, stored or leaked. For many users, that alone can strengthen trust in digital verification.
The real obstacles, however, are more institutional than technical. Many organisations still over-collect data–either out of habit or because it feels safer from a compliance standpoint. Users, too, often overshare simply to avoid friction. For the new system to work as intended, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will need to pair the technology with clear rules, credible penalties for Offline Verification Seeking Entities that collect excess information, and simple channels for users to report misuse. Technology creates the possibility of control; enforcement is what makes that control meaningful.
UIDAI aims to create an ecosystem of OVSEs across sectors such as hotels, event access, and residential societies. Given India’s uneven connectivity, digital literacy, and operational capacity, what risks might hinder inclusive adoption, and how can these be mitigated to avoid excluding marginalised groups?
UIDAI’s plan to build a broad network of OVSEs–from hotels and event venues to residential societies–is promising, but uneven digital readiness across India could create new forms of exclusion. Smaller or community-level OVSEs, especially in rural or semi-urban areas with weak connectivity, may hesitate to adopt certified offline-verification devices because of cost, operational complexity or the training required to use them securely. If these actors refuse or fail to accept legitimate offline Aadhaar credentials, people who depend on simple, low-tech verification risk being left out. A system designed to widen access could, unintentionally, deepen the digital divide.
Mitigating this requires design choices anchored in simplicity and support. UIDAI could ease adoption by subsidising or fully covering the cost of certified devices for non-commercial and social-sector OVSEs, making participation virtually costless. Providing easy, open-source SDKs would ensure operators do not need advanced technical skills. And field-based, multilingual training delivered through local institutions can help community-level operators use the system consistently and confidently. Inclusive architecture, not just advanced technology, will determine whether offline verification achieves its intended reach.
Moving identity checks from online systems to offline modes changes compliance, auditability, and fraud-monitoring dynamics. What governance and regulatory safeguards should UIDAI and MeitY prioritise to ensure that offline Aadhaar verification remains secure, transparent, and resilient against misuse in everyday, non-banking contexts?
Shifting identity checks from online systems to offline modes fundamentally changes the governance model. Instead of monitoring a single central system, authorities now have to ensure endpoint governance where every device and operator is part of the security perimeter.
The UIDAI and the MeitY should prioritise three safeguards.
First, robust certification of devices and processes: OVSE hardware and software should undergo regular audits to prevent tampering, maintain secure logs that form the audit trail, and clearly show users exactly what data is being shared.
Second, a tiered compliance model: non-banking OVSEs should follow simple, standard rules scaled to the sensitivity of the data they handle, so that small businesses and community operators aren’t overburdened.
Third, strong redressal mechanisms: users should have an easy, preferably offline, way to report rejected credentials or misuse. This preserves accountability even in low-connectivity areas where online complaint channels may not function reliably.
Author:
Dr. Mehak Rai Sethi is an Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, Amity University, Punjab.
Views are personal.